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BEYOND THE "WAR" ON TERRORISM: 
TOWARDS THE NEW INTELLIGENCE 
NETWORK 
Ronald D. Lee* and Paul M. Schwartz** 
TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY: WINNING WITHOUT WAR. 
By Phillip B. Heymann. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 2003. Pp. xii, 211 .  
Cloth, $24.95; paper, $14 .95. 
In Terrorism, Freedom, and Security, Philip B. Heymann 
undertakes a wide-ranging study of how the United States can - and 
in his view should - respond to the threat of international terrorism. 
A former Deputy Attorney General of the United States Department 
of Justice ("DOJ") and current James Barr Ames Professor of Law at 
Harvard Law School, H eymann draws on his governmental experience 
and jurisprudential background in developing a series of nuanced 
approaches to preventing terrorism.1 
Heymann makes clear his own policy and legal preferences. First, 
as his choice of subtitle suggests, he firmly rejects the widely used 
metaphor of the United States engaging in a "war" on terrorism. 
Heymann views this mental model and the policies it spawns or is said 
to justify as, at best, incomplete, and, at worst, ineffective in 
preventing terrorist attacks and harmful to democracy in the United 
States (pp. 19-36). Second, Heymann advocates the paramount 
importance of intelligence to identify and disrupt terrorists' plans and 
to prevent terrorists from attacking their targets (p. 61). Heymann 
observes that the United States needs both "tactical intelligence" to 
stop specific terrorist plans and "strategic intelligence" to 
understand the goals, organization, resources, and skills of terrorist 
organizations (p. 62) .  
* Partner, Arnold & Porter LLP, Washington, D.C.; Associate Deputy Attorney 
General, U.S. Department of Justice, 1998-2000; General Counsel, National Security 
Agency, 1994-98; Chief of Staff, Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence 
Agency, 1996. A.B. 1980, Princeton; M.Phil. (International Relations) 1982, Oxford; J.D. 
1985, Yale. - Ed. We would like to thank Ted Janger, Lance Liebman, Daniel Solove, and 
John Yoo for their comments on previous drafts. 
** Visiting Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall), Spring 
and Fall Semesters, 2005; Anita and Stuart Subotnick Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law 
School. B.A. 1981, Brown; J.D. 1985, Yale. - Ed. 
1. Although we generally use the term "terrorism" throughout this Review for purposes 
of remaining concise, we use it to refer to "international terrorism," not to terrorism 
conducted by United States citizens. 
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May 2005) Beyond the "War" on Terrorism 1447 
At the same time, however, a heightened reliance on accurate and 
timely intelligence comes with risks. Heymann is concerned about 
the creation and consequences of an "intelligence state" in the United 
States. Here is the crux of the problem for both the govern­
ment and the governed: we need precise, detailed, and accurate 
intelligence more than ever, but the agencies that comprise the 
United States Intelligence Community ("USIC") can cause harm to 
the fabric of civic society because of their information-gathering 
capabilities (p. 135). 
In this Review's Part I, we assess the idea of a "war" on terrorism 
as policy tool and metaphor. We also examine Heymann's alternative 
instruments, including diplomacy, intelligence, control over terrorist 
finances, and law enforcement. As a related topic, we consider the 
safeguards that Heymann develops for preventing the rise of an 
American intelligence state. This Part concludes with an exploration 
of how Heymann's rejection of the metaphor of a war on terrorism is 
amplified and extended by social psychology research regarding 
"framing effects" as well as by a classic study of the Cuban 
missile crisis. 
This Review's Part II looks at two additional aspects of Heymann's 
vision of future uses of intelligence to thwart terrorism. In Section 
II.A, we describe the contours of data mining, a technique of 
intelligence analysis that Heymann advocates. Although Heymann 
notes that data mining is likely to have an adverse effect on privacy, 
he does not develop detailed safeguards in response. A Pentagon 
study panel, the Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee 
("T APAC"), has, however, developed a recommended framework for 
governmental use of data mining techniques. We find that the TAPAC 
recommendations generally provide a solid baseline for confronting 
the privacy implications of this technique, but we call for further work 
on data quality issues in governmental database management as well 
as further assessment of the necessary judicial role in data mining. 
In this Review's Section 11.B, we turn to an important policy 
discussion related to data mining: How can the USIC better 
disseminate and collaborate on intelligence? A central aspect of this 
policy debate has been proposals to build a new intelligence network. 
In the new network, intelligence will not be "stovepiped," which refers 
to the practice of intelligence agencies holding onto the immediate 
results of their work. In contrast, the new network will greatly broaden 
access to raw intelligence - both within the USIC and beyond. We 
sketch the proposed form of the new intelligence network and analyze 
four important legal and policy questions that it raises. 
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I. SECURITY WITHOUT WAR AND THE INTELLIGENCE STATE 
Heymann's premise is twofold. First, war as a metaphor and as a 
justification for post-9/11 U.S. policy measures has been counter­
productive and is making the world a more dangerous place for the 
United States. Second, security for the United States ultimately 
depends on careful and discriminating choices among alternative 
instruments, including diplomacy, intelligence, control over terrorist 
finances, and law enforcement. In this Part of the Review, we analyze 
Heymann's two premises and his thought experiment considering the 
"intelligence state," a potential dystopia resulting from the struggle to 
keep America safe. 
A. The Flawed War Metaphor and the Military's Limited Role 
For Heymann, the idea of a "war" on terrorism is a flawed 
metaphor that encourages use of the wrong tactics and mistakenly 
implies that incursions into democratic values are both above question 
and temporary in duration. As Heymann states: "Talk of 'war' as if 
that substitutes for a recognition of the complexity of the situation and 
the richness of our goals and the variety of our alternatives is simply 
folly" {p. 170). The United States faces multiple possible threats, 
ranging from limited violence to a continuing campaign of violence, to 
spectacular attempts to kill Americans, to the use of weapons of mass 
destruction (p. 22) .  The United States also faces a series of different 
enemies, who are not likely to be eliminated or even diminished by 
deploym ent of traditional military forces (p. 22). 
To be sure, the military can help at  times. For example, it is 
essential in a situation, such as Afghanistan , where the U.S. goal is to 
destroy a regime that allows refuge to terrorist organizations, such as 
Al Qaeda (p. 22) .  Heymann expresses a firm conviction that the 
United States "must prevent Al Qaeda from finding a home in any 
nation" (p. 23) . Yet, the threat to the United States will not always be 
from a hostile nation that provides a haven to a group planning attacks 
on the United States. At other times, the threat resembles something 
more "like the problem of drug-dealing" {p. 24). Heymann notes: 
"Attacking harboring nations will still be important, but it will prove 
inadequate in light of the sobering fact that terrorist groups, like 
organized crime groups, have been able to work around the world 
without the tolerance, let alone support, of the government where 
they are located" (p. 24). 
Thus, one way in which the concept of a "war" against terrorism 
falls short is that the U.S. response generally will not consist of 
attempts to vanquish one or more traditional nation-states. Heymann 
also observes that unlike the situation during a traditional war, the 
United States has considerable uncertainty about the motivations, 
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organizations, resources, and plans of terrorists - and sometimes 
even their identities (pp. 27, 67) . 
While skeptical of any overreliance on tactics linked to the concept 
of war, Heymann acknowledges the grave danger that the United 
States faces through the potential availability to terrorists of nuclear 
and other weapons of mass destruction. At the top of his list, indeed, 
of what changed on 9/11 is that "the ruthlessness and devastation of 
the attacks convinced us that terrorists targeting the United States 
would in fact use weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear and 
biological weapons, if they could obtain and deliver them" (p. 7) . This 
point undercuts the reassuring impact of Heymann's earlier comment: 
"[W]e face . . .  a very prolonged series of contests with opponents that 
do not have the powers . . . to defeat our armies, or destroy our 
powerful economy, or threaten to occupy our territory - the 
dangerous characteristics we have traditionally associated with war" 
(p. 161) .  At any rate, even for this most dire of threats, Heymann 
argues, "military or war-like measures" remain of limited usefulness in 
preventing nuclear terrorism (p. 24) . As he notes: 
Our gravest dangers from nuclear terrorists may well flow from the fact 
that enriched uranium or even nuclear weapons may be illegally sold or 
poorly guarded in, say, Russia or Pakistan. Then the language of 'war' 
would serve us poorly; for what we need is a structure of incentives and 
prohibitions in cooperation with these countries. (p. 24; footnote 
omitted) 
A further problem with the concept of a war on terrorism, 
according to Heymann, is that  this idea will encourage use of anti­
terrorism techniques that threaten core values of a democratic society. 
As noted above, in contrast to more traditional wars of U.S. history, 
terrorism in its different forms does not pose a temporary threat. 
Actions that impinge on civil liberties are, as a consequence, likely to 
last for decades and might end by changing the nature of American 
democracy and reducing the protections provided by the United States 
Constitution. Hence, one should not accept an approach that  Kathleen 
Sullivan disapprovingly terms the "black hole" theory of constitutional 
rights in wartime.2 Under this approach, rejected by both Sullivan and 
2. See Christopher Reed, A re American Liberties at Risk?, HARV. MAG., Jan.-Feb. 2002, 
at 100-01 (summarizing Kathleen M. Sullivan, Address on War, Peace, and Civil Liberties, as 
part of the Tanner Lecture on Human Values at Harvard University, Nov. 8, 2001); see also 
DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 1 (2d ed. 2002) 
("The record of our nation's response to the threat of political violence is unfortunately one 
of repeated infringements on the First Amendment and other constitutional principles."); 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Under a Watchful Eye, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS (Richard c. 
Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2d ed. 2003). For a contrasting view, see Eric A. Posner & 
Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605, 619 (2003) 
("Generally speaking, there is no reason to suppose that laws, policies, and bureaucratic 
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Heymann, constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties disappear into 
a "black hole" during a war, and then reemerge once the nation is at 
peace (p. 161) .  
Democratic liberties cannot merely be pushed aside until the 
threat from terrorism abates. As Heymann writes: "Because the 
danger is enduring, we must develop ways of adjusting that leave 
much of what we value in place while we deal with a prolonged period 
of danger from relatively small groups - only some of which will seek 
or need state support" (p. 162). Here, Heymann might have engaged 
in further comparisons with events during the cold war - the most 
recent "war" fought by means other than military force in which the 
United States was engaged and which ended with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. 
In the case of terrorism, like the cold war, a decisive military 
victory is neither feasible nor, even were it to occur, likely to end the 
threat to the United States. The cold war extended over decades with 
a diffuse threat and opponents about which much was unknown -
indeed, the opening of East Bloc archives throughout the 1990s has 
provided necessary source material for historians who are now 
improving our understanding of the period.3 Moreover, although 
traditional nation-states, such as the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact 
Nations, supplied much of the threat to the United States, the 
opponents of the United States at the time also sought to export a 
fundamental ideology, namely, Communism, throughout the world 
and relied, at least to some extent, upon local cells, including some 
based in this country.4 The United States' opposition to Communism 
was both an epic struggle with another superpower and one carried 
out against a broader transnational threat. 
To a remarkable extent, however, the policy debate about the 
threats from terrorism and the most effective ways to counter these 
dangers has ignored the national experience with the cold war. This 
omission is particularly striking because the intelligence community, 
which Heymann places at the forefront of his strategy, also played a 
leading role in the protection of U.S. interests during the cold war. For 
example, intelligence played a critical role in the Cuban missile crisis; 
institutions created during an emergency (1) systematically fail to change, or change back, 
after a crisis has passed (2) because of institutional inertia and interest group pressure."). 
3. As examples of books that have drawn on newly accessible East Bloc archival 
material, see HARVEY KLEHR ET AL., THE SECRET WORLD OF AMERICAN COMMUNISM 
(1995); NORMAN M. NAIMARK, THE RUSSIANS IN GERMANY, 1945-1949 (1995); NIGEL 
WEST & OLEG TSAREV, THE CROWN JEWELS: THE BRITISH SECRETS AT THE HEART OF 
THE KGB ARCHIVES (1999). The second edition of GRAHAM ALLISON & PHILIP ZELIKOW, 
ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (2d ed. 1999), draws on 
both Soviet archives and recently declassified tapes from the Kennedy administration. We 
discuss Essence of Decision in Section l.D, infra. 
4. KLEHR ET AL., supra note 3, at xv. 
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imagery from U-2 reconnaissance aircraft alerted President John F. 
Kennedy to the Soviet Union's construction of missile bases in Cuba 
and later confirmed the satisfactory dismantling of those bases. 5 
B. The Threat to Civil Liberties 
Throughout Terrorism, Freedom, and Security, the general 
approach is to look beyond any single administration and its actions in 
order to evaluate more broadly the multifaceted nature of the threat 
posed by terrorism and the implications of possible U.S. responses. At 
this point in his argument, however, Heymann changes his overall 
tenor in order to zero in on certain controversial actions of President 
George W. Bush's administration. Heymann pulls no punches in his 
negative evaluation of the Bush administration's impact on civil 
liberties. In his judgment, these techniques include the plan to try 
resident aliens and, in some circumstances, Americans, before military 
tribunals; the secret detention of suspects; closed deportation hearings; 
the Pentagon's planning for assassination of terrorist suspects abroad; 
the creation of a new class of wartime detainees abroad; and the legal 
position that no signif icant judicial review of these detentions should 
take place (pp. 89-98). 
Heymann's critique of the Bush administration can be updated. In 
June 2004, the Supreme Court, in a remarkable pair of cases, 
recognized the rights of both U.S. citizens and noncitizens to go to 
federal court to challenge their designation by the United States 
government as "enemy combatants" and their indefinite detention on 
the basis of that designation.6 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court 
considered the habeas challenge of Hamdi, a U.S. citizen who had 
been captured in Afghanistan.7 The U.S. government designated him 
as an enemy combatant and detained him in a naval brig in South 
Carolina.8 His father filed a habeas petition on his behalf.9 Justice 
O'Connor, joined by three other Justices, held that Congress had 
authorized the detention of unlawful combatants, but that a detained 
5. ALLISON & ZELIKOW, supra note 3, at 221-24, 335-53. 
6. In a third case, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2712 (2004), the U.S. government 
designated Padilla, a U.S. citizen detained in New York federal criminal custody, as an 
enemy combatant and held him in a Navy brig in South Carolina. The Supreme Court found 
that the proper respondent was Padilla's immediate custodian, the brig's commander, and 
that the Southern District of New York, where Padilla's counsel had filed a habeas petition 
on his behalf, did not have jurisdiction over the brig's commander. Id. at 2722. The Supreme 
Court therefore did not reach the merits of Padilla's claim of entitlement to challenge his 
detention in habeas. 
7. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
8. Id. at 2636. 
9. Id. 
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U.S. citizen who seeks to challenge his classification as an enemy 
combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for that 
classif ication and a fair opportunity to rebut the government's factual 
assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.10 Two other Justices, while 
disagreeing with the plurality's conclusion on other points, agreed that 
Hamdi should be afforded notice of the basis for his designation as an 
enemy combatant and a meaningful opportunity to offer evidence 
that he is not an enemy combatant.11 Despite the DOJ's assertions as 
to Hamdi's dangerousness, the U .S. government decided to release 
him rather than provide him with the legal process that the Supreme 
Court mandated. The release was conditioned on Hamdi's renouncing 
his U.S. citizenship and agreeing to remain continuously in Saudi 
Arabia for five years.12 
As for the rights of aliens, in Rasul v. Bush, the U.S. military had 
captured two Australians and twelve Kuwaiti nationals during its 
campaign in Afghanistan.1 3 As of March 2005, the military still holds 
all but two of the Rasul petitioners in custody at the U.S. Navy's base 
in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in indefinite detention, with limited access 
to counsel, and without notice of the charges, if any, against them.14 
Through their next friends, petitioners filed suits challenging their 
detention.1 5 The Supreme Court decided that U.S. courts have 
jurisdiction to consider their challenges to the legality of their 
detention at Guantanamo Bay.16 The Court found that petitioners 
could invoke the courts' habeas jurisdiction and that the courts also 
had jurisdiction over the Kuwaiti petitioners' claims under federal 
question jurisdiction and the Alien Tort Statute.17 
For Heymann, former Attorney General Ashcroft merits special 
criticism. To be sure, Heymann recognizes the sometimes difficult 
conflicts between security and historic democratic freedoms. In his 
recognition of these conflicts, Heymann even admits the value of 
certain controversial decisions by Ashcroft, such as his reducing the 
protection from FBI surveillance that previous Attorneys General had 
10. Id. at 2635. 
11. Id. at 2660 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the 
judgment); id. at 2685 (Thomas, J . ,  dissenting). 
12. Joel Brinkley, From Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia, via Guantdnamo, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 16, 2004, at A4. 
13. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). 
14. Id. at 2690. Mandouh Habib, one of the Australians, was transferred to the 
Government of Australia in January 2005. Nasser al-Mutairi, one of the Kuwaitis, was 
transferred to the Government of Kuwait in January 2005. 
15. Id. at 2691. 
16. Id. at 2698. 
17. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000) (habeas jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) 
(federal question jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (Alien Tort Statute)). 
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granted to religious and political meetings, and easing the conditions 
under which FBI agents can carry out Internet research on individuals 
(p. 103). In taking these actions, Ashcroft modified former Attorney 
General Edward Levi's Guidelines, dating from the Ford 
administration.18 The DOJ issued the Levi Guidelines in response to 
abuses of civil liberties by the FBI and other parts of government.19 
Heymann observes that the new Ashcroft rules burden civil liberties: 
the political threat includes these rules' chilling effect on religious 
expression at mosques or on political expression (such as "pro­
Palestinian meetings") (p. 103). Nevertheless, Heymann does not 
reject the new DOJ policy. After initially terming it "defensible," he 
admits that " [t]he case for these changes is strong" (p. 103). 
According to Heymann, the flaw in DOJ decisionmaking in the 
Bush Administration is that it has favored governmental anti-terrorist 
actions that, at best, provide scant additional protections, but that 
have a significant negative impact on civil liberties. Heymann points to 
a number of "anti-terrorist techniques whose promise does not 
warrant their cost in lost values of a democratic society," such as 
the secret detainment of "low probability suspects" and closed 
deportation hearings (p. 160). Heymann objects not only to the 
substance of these particular policy choices, but also to the process of 
DOJ decisionmaking. He states: "In making these decisions, the 
Justice Department showed no recognition of the real costs they 
involve" (p. 103). With elements of sorrow and anger, Heymann 
summarizes his view: "What isn't permissible is the view that Attorney 
General Ashcroft has repeatedly enunciated: that the job of the 
Justice Department is to go as far as legally possible in protecting even 
limited amounts of security without consideration of the long-term 
costs in democratic freedoms . . . .  " (p. 90). 
Heymann envisions a different role for the Attorney General and 
DOJ; he calls for public discussion of the necessary trade-offs, and, at 
a minimum, the assigning of some value to long-established civil 
liberties. One might term this approach a conservative one; skeptical 
of change, it places some weight, in an amount that Heymann 
18. GUIDELINES BY ATTORNEY GENERAL EDWARD LEVI ON DOMESTIC 
INTELLIGENCE: DOMESTIC SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS (Mar. 1976), available at 
http://www.icdc.com/-paulwolf/cointelprolleviguidelines.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2005). The 
Electronic Privacy Information Center has collected subsequent versions of these guidelines 
up to the latest revisions by Attorney General Ashcroft. See ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES, at http://www.epic.org/privacy/fbi/ (last updated 
Mar. 17, 2003). For the Ashcroft Guidelines, see THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES 
ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISES AND TERRORISM ENTERPRISE 
INVESTIGATIONS (May 30, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/generalcrimes2.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2005). 
19. Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1306, 1326 (2004). 
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ultimately leaves unspecified, in favor of established civil freedoms 
and practices. One might think of it as a proposed rule of civil liberties 
stare decisis for the executive branch. 
Beyond his criticisms of the threats to civil liberties and the process 
of decisionmaking by the Bush administration, Heymann offers two 
additional objections to the Bush administration's counterterrorism 
efforts. He contends that it has sought to block the involvement of 
other branches of government in its plans and placed an emphasis on 
secrecy in matters great and small. First, Heymann notes: "The costs 
of not trusting the Congress and the courts are grave and unjustified" 
(p. 160). He observes that the Bush administration, in taking such 
actions as secret detainments and closed deportation hearings, did not 
seek prior authorization from Congress or any court. Indeed, it has 
engaged in "a strategy of preventing, after the fact, the operation of 
the separation of powers (denying the need for legislative oversight 
and the right of judicial review)" (p. 160). 
Second, Heymann argues that the Bush administration's lack of 
respect for other branches of government has also been accompanied 
by its strategy of concealment. Terrorism, Freedom, and Security offers 
numerous illustrations of such governmental secrecy. The Bush 
Administration has sought to keep "material of low strategic 
importance, such as the number of people detaiped, secret from the 
public" (p. 160). More generally, the government has also "sought 
to deny the American people full knowledge of what is being 
done" (p. 90) . 
This inclination to secrecy is not limited to terrorism. One need 
only think of the Administration's refusal to share information about 
Vice-President Richard Cheney's energy task force and its restrictive 
approach to Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") requests. 20 Note, 
moreover, that these two policy examples predate 9/11 and, at least to 
some extent, undercut the Heymann thesis that the problem of secrecy 
is "largely attributable to the blanketing of our responses to 
September 11 with the concept of 'war'" (p. 160). For a more recent 
example of Bush administration secrecy, and one also unrelated to 
terrorism, one can point to threats made by a top administration 
official at the Department of Health and Human Services to Richard 
S. Foster, the chief Medicare actuary, to dissuade him from providing 
data to Congress showing that the cost of the new Medicare law would 
20. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004); OFF. OF INFO. AND 
PRIVACY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NEW ATTORNEY GENERAL FOIA MEMORANDUM 
ISSUED (Oct. 15, 2001), at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/200lfoiapost19.htm. 
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exceed estimates that the White House was providing. 21 Different 
administrations clearly have different styles of governance. 
C. Heymann's Prescriptions: Thwarting Terrorists and Blocking the 
Intelligence State 
What then would Heymann have the United States do in 
combating terrorists? Heymann's rejection of the organizing metaphor 
of war is accompanied by his presentation of a careful taxonomy of 
actions that might contribute to success against terrorism. These 
actions, which are to be taken within the United States and abroad, in 
whatever combination may be effective, include lowering the 
terrorists ' will to act against the United States; denying terrorists 
access to recruits, targets, and resources; identifying potential 
terrorists in advance; and thwarting their plans, through arrest, 
detention, and freezes or seizures of assets (pp. 28-29, 40). It is in these 
realms, Heymann argues, that means other than war are likely to be 
more effective than a military campaign led by the Department of 
Defense. Moreover, while the United States faces serious threats, they 
are ones in which the military is ultimately less important than other 
governmental entities, including the State Department, Department of 
Homeland Security, USIC, and law enforcement agencies at the 
federal, state, and local levels. 
As the primary means of safeguarding the United States against 
terrorism, Heymann calls for greater international cooperation and 
increased reliance on intelligence. At the end of the day, Heymann 
seeks "a new international norm against terrorism" based on 
"dedicated host-nation cooperation" (p. 32). Concerning international 
cooperation, the essential, if "distinctly limited role" for the military, 
according to Heymann, must be accompanied by expanded 
partnerships at the international level (p. 29). He writes: " [W]e need a 
level of willing and competent cooperation abroad that we cannot 
effectively compel. That limits the usefulness of military force and 
requires persuasion and developing partnerships at the working level" 
(p. 32). Put simply, "we will not be able to discover who is plotting 
against us without the cooperation of foreign governments" (p. 119) . 
International cooperation is also needed to reduce "the sea of 
individuals" in the Muslim world "whose felt grievances led to 
enthusiasm for Bin Laden's attacks" (p. 25). Although Heymann 
admits that limited possibilities exist for the United States to reduce 
the grievances of the Muslim world, he argues "we have little to lose 
21. Amy Goldstein, Foster: White House Had Role in Withholding Medicare Data, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2004, at A2; see Dorothy Samuels, Psst. President Bush is Hard at 
Work Expanding Government Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2004, at A24. 
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and much to gain by showing concern for the well-being - the 
nutrition, health, education, governance, and human rights - of 
Muslim populations around the world" (p. 44). Here, too, Heymann 
says, the idea of a war on terrorism leads us astray. Heymann argues: 
"An undefined war on terrorism will look like a return of the 
Crusades to many Muslims" (p. 27) . 
Beyond international cooperation, Heymann also stresses the 
importance of gathering intelligence about terrorist activities. 22 As 
promising as Heymann believes intelligence to be, he worries as well 
about a potential negative consequence of this emphasis on 
information and develops the thought experiment of the "intelligence 
state" (pp. 133-57) . 
In Heymann's thought experiment, we are to imagine that it is 
2000, and, due to fear of terrorism, the government is making a 
signif icant effort to track the movement and activities of all 
Americans, keeping extensive files, and even using the military to 
gather this information (pp. 135-39) . The government . is also 
encouraging citizens to report any suspicions or other concerns about 
their neighbors and placing informants in organizations that might be 
considered dangerous or critical of the government (pp. 135-39) . 
Finally, the government in 2010 is using electronic surveillance more 
freely and frequently than today, and the President is detaining 
Americans or aliens indefinitely and trying long-time residents, and 
even nonmilitary citizens, before military tribunals (pp. 135-39) . 
This intelligence state resembles Communist East Germany with 
its dreaded secret police, the Stasi. It is a state that makes extensive 
use of a massive collection of personal files; demands and stores 
information from neighbors and friends; and engages in intrusive, 
broadly aimed surveillance. Heymann concludes this thought 
experiment with a stern warning: 
[A] state that relies on intelligence activities instead of criminal 
investigations is likely to look promising as a more effective way of 
preventing terrorism, but it would create grave new risks. Intelligence 
agencies can define the threats they address, are not limited by 
definitions of crimes, are not limited in gathering private information to 
what is more than suggestive, have no burden of establishing the 
reliability of their product beyond a reasonable doubt, can engage in 
illegal activities secretly, and thus without political accountability, and 
can readily be turned to political purposes or allowed to drift in that 
direction. (p. 138) 
The threat that the intelligence state poses, at the end of the day, is to 
democracy itself. A reluctance to engage in dissent can become 
22. In Part II of this Review, infra, we look in more detail at Heymann's ideas regarding 
revamping how the USIC uses intelligence. 
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ingrained in the citizenry and have a profoundly corrosive impact 
on democracy. 
Heymann's intelligence state provides a useful hypothetical 
example. We wish to note, however, that part of it is built around 
a false dichotomy. Reconsider the quotation in the preceding 
paragraph; Heymann contrasts "intelligence activities" with "criminal 
investigations" and indicates that he favors the latter. But the 
comparison is flawed because, as he develops it, Heymann 
contrasts rogue intelligence organizations with well-behaved law 
enforcement agencies. 
Heymann presents no evidence or theoretical model that 
demonstrates how greater use of criminal investigations will drive 
down the overall level of abuses of civil liberties. Indeed, the law 
enforcement apparatus is also open to abuse. A state might change the 
definition of crimes ex post facto, use the police to enlist or coerce the 
populace to gather private information, and bring criminal 
prosecutions against political opponents for illegitimate reasons and 
with flimsy or even fabricated evidence. Rigorous oversight as well as 
tough operational, policy, and legal controls are essential to avoid 
these kinds of abuses by both the USIC and the law enforcement 
community. Finally, Heymann overlooks the fact that many of the 
results that we expect from our government in fighting terrorism -
warnings of heightened risks of attack, foiling terrorist plots, and 
weakening terrorist capacities - are not the central focus of 
traditional law enforcement activities. 
Despite these shortcomings, Heymann's thought experiment has 
the considerable merit of encouraging a policy debate about how to 
prevent these excesses. Heymann himself offers a four-part plan that 
he bases on specific lessons of U.S. history as revealed in the 1970s. 
During this time, the Church Committee's hearings in the Senate 
demonstrated that the USIC and U.S. military had carried out internal 
security activities in which information was gathered "indiscriminately 
about perfectly peaceful organizations. "23 
Heymann's prescriptions for avoiding an intelligence state also 
generally track the existing legal framework governing the USIC's 
activities. Critical elements of this framework include the Foreign 
23. Pp. 141-42; SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH 
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITTES, 94TH CONG., FINAL REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE 
ACTIVITTES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS,  Bk. II, pt. I (1976), available at 
http://www.icdc.com/-paulwolf/cointelpro/churchfinalreportlla.htm (2002). For recent 
discussions of the continuing relevance of these findings, see Swire, supra note 19, at 1348, 
and George P. Varghese, Comment, A Sense of Purpose: The Role of Law Enforcement in 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 385, 430 (2003). 
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Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), enacted in 1978;24 Executive 
Order 12,333, issued in 1981;25 and guidelines from the DOJ and 
Director of Central Intelligence.26 The critical lessons can be distilled, 
according to Heymann, into four necessary protections: (1) keep 
internal security functions out of the hands of the military and the 
CIA; (2) define the permissible scope of domestic intelligence; (3) 
limit the intelligence agency to statutorily defined legal powers; and 
( 4) maintain critically important oversight activities (pp. 139-57) . Each 
of these elements of Heymann's core prescriptions is worth examining 
in turn. 
His first key restriction on the USIC is a requirement that separate 
agencies have responsibilities for domestic and foreign surveillance 
activities. As a generalization, which necessarily entails exceptions, 
· U.S. law permits the USIC, including the CIA and the NSA, to 
exercise greater powers outside the United States than within it. 
Heymann finds this distinction justifiable because "[w]ithin the United 
States, we want a very different attitude toward the law" (p. 140). 
Equally importantly, U.S. law grants the military only a limited ability 
to gather information within our borders.27 
One criticism of this point is that it writes off as largely beyond the 
reach of the law the activities of the USIC gathering foreign 
intelligence outside the United States. In fact, those activities, 
particularly as they relate to Americans, are and should be closely 
regulated by U.S. law. Another problem with this model is that it 
assumes that a rigid division of labor between agencies pursuing 
domestic activities and agencies pursuing foreign activities is possible. 
As one example of the need for cooperation between domestic law 
enforcement and international police, the FBI has Legal Attache 
(Legat) Offices abroad.28 Among the activities of the Legats is to 
help in resolution of FBI domestic investigations which have 
international components. 29 
24. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. (2000)). 
25. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, 201 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (2000). 
26. For an overview of the DOJ Guidelines with excerpts from them, see STEPHEN 
DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 701-12 (3d ed. 2002). 
27. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, 201 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (2000). 
28. FBI, LEGATS, http://www.fbi.gov/contactllegat/legat.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2005). 
29. The Legat program focuses on drug trafficking, international terrorism, and 
economic espionage. Id. For a discussion of the Legals' work in opposing organized crime in 
Southeast Europe, see The Impact of Organized Crime and Corruption on Democratic 
Reform: Hearing Before the Comm'n on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 106th Cong. 6-
7 (2000) (statement of James K. Weber, Deputy Assistant Dir., Investigative Serv. Div., 
FBI), at http://www.csce.gov/briefings.cfm?briefing_id=43. 
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A rigid separation is, of course, neither feasible nor desirable, as 
Heymann concedes at points, particularly in an era when international 
terrorists move freely around the world and routinely seek to 
penetrate the United States' borders to gather intelligence and plan 
and execute terrorist attacks. In addition, as Heymann admits, "there 
are some costs to the exclusion of the military and the CIA" (p. 142). 
One of these costs is especially important in light of 9/11: "[I]nsisting 
on separating intelligence-gathering activities at home from those 
abroad creates problems in combining the information gathered in the 
United States with the information that is gathered abroad" (p. 142). 
Here, Heymann might have discussed in more detail methods for 
allowing information sharing consistent with a limited domestic role 
for the CIA and military. 
Heymann's second key safeguard is to have the law carefully and 
publicly define the subjects of permissible intelligence gathering. He 
hones in on one circumstance in which the government gathers 
information, namely, when it is seeking to prevent grave dangers. 
Heymann notes that FISA permits such information gathering against 
individuals in investigations in the United States involving espionage 
and terrorism in which a significant foreign component exists (p. 148) . 
Heymann states that surveillance is also permissible if "a severe, 
politically motivated, danger to the people or the Constitution" exists 
along with a foreign connection and imminent danger is present (p. 
149) . With this sentence, Heymann paraphrases another part of FISA. 
He is particularly concerned, moreover, with a situation when the 
official who "controls intelligence capacities" exceeds her authority or 
bends the rules and investigates people who are engaged in 
permissible dissent rather than activities that actually pose grave 
dangers (p. 147). Yet, it should be noted that FISA's definition of an 
"agent of foreign power" who is a United States person requires 
criminal acts. 30 This requirement seeks to minimize the risk that 
individuals will be targeted for exercise of First Amendment rights. 31 
As for his third safeguard, Heymann desires creation of statutorily 
defined legal powers that restrict the activities of intelligence agencies. 
Here, Heymann praises FISA: 
We know that [FISA] has worked, and worked well. If specific additional 
powers are needed, they can and should be legislated by a very willing 
Congress. If broad additional powers are needed to deal with ongoing 
30. 50 u.s.c. § 1801(b)(2) (2000). 
31. For a warning, however, regarding the scope of the 2002 Ashcroft Guidelines, see 
Swire, supra note 19, at 1352. As Swire explains: "The Levi Guidelines have given way to the 
2002 Ashcroft Guidelines, which far more aggressively contemplate surveillance of First 
Amendment activities in the name of domestic security." Id. 
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national emergencies, they too can be legislated and limited to 
circumstances that are at least defined generally. (p. 151) 
In a nutshell then, Heymann proposes that the government be 
permitted to use secret, intrusive investigatory techniques only under 
limited circumstances that Congress has specified. 
The fourth and final safeguard is to create oversight authorities 
that will promote effective intelligence gathering consistent with the 
rule of law by domestic intelligence agencies. This oversight is to be 
both external, involving congressional committees, and internal, 
involving inspector generals and other agency oversight mechanisms. 
Yet, Heymann notes multiple difficulties in structuring oversight. For 
example, intelligence agencies must act in secret, but as a consequence 
"rules and limits on jurisdiction and responsibility are likely to be 
ignored" (p. 152). This generalization would have been sharpened 
through a more detailed discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of 
existing structures within and outside the USIC that identify, 
investigate, and correct any such transgressions. Heymann might 
usefully have elaborated his views as to how the current structure of 
oversight in the United States should be revised. 3 2  
Heymann does observe, however, that even once an oversight 
entity is in place, intelligence agencies may not willingly provide 
information needed for oversight (pp. 154-56) .  Heymann points to the 
complaints of congressional intelligence committees after 9/11 
regarding the difficulty of getting full information from the FBI and 
CIA. He concludes: "Without that cooperation, it is extremely 
unlikely that even congressional overseers can reliably discover what 
is or is not being done by an intelligence agency" (pp. 155-56) .  While 
the sparring over the control and disclosure of information was 
ultimately resolved to the satisfaction of the 9/11 Commission, and 
may not seem different than any of the numerous non-intelligence 
instances in which one branch of the federal government demands 
information and another branch declines to provide it (stonewalling), 
the implications are particularly significant when they involve matters 
of national security and civil liberties. 3 3  
32. The intelligence activities of the executive branch are regulated internally by the 
executive branch, including the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, the Inspectors 
General, and General Counsels of the intelligence agencies, and by the judiciary, as well as 
by congressional oversight. Heymann also notes that internal oversight, as through an 
inspector general model, can usefully supplement external oversight. He points with 
approval, in fact, to the report from the Inspector General of the DOJ in 2003 that was 
critical of the detention of illegal aliens after 9/11. P. 155. 
33. In certain other contexts, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution as 
resolving inter-branch conflicts. See, e.g. , United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
The 9/11  Commission offered detailed suggestions regarding oversight. Its interviews 
with "numerous members of Congress from both parties, as well as congressional staff 
members" revealed widespread dissatisfaction with congressional oversight. 9/1 1  
COMMISSION, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
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D. Of Framing Effects and Multiple Policy Perspectives 
To conclude Part I, we wish to return to Heymann's rejection of 
the metaphor of the "war" on terror. In place of this idea, Heymann 
develops an alternative: namely, his different taxonomies, including 
"the less accessible but more revealing division of terrorism into 
almost a dozen categories of threat" (p. 87) . Warning against reliance 
on a one-dimensional metaphor that will limit our thinking about the 
best ways to combat terrorism, Heymann argues: " [WJhat we should 
be doing is reviewing, skeptically, what is on our menu of choices and 
then choosing not what is popular but what is most l ikely to be 
effective in protecting our security in the short run and in the long 
run" (p. 87). In other words, the nature of the perspective that one 
adopts for tackling a problem matters, and the "war" metaphor is the 
wrong one for responding to the threat of terrorism. To explore 
Heymann's central insight further, we wish to consider two further 
topics: social psychology research regarding "framing effects," and a 
classic study of the Cuban missile  crisis. 
Empirical work in the field of social psychology has documented 
the existence of the phenomenon of "framing effects. "34 Although 
Heymann does not discuss this research, it in fact bolsters his 
connection between the wrong metaphor and bad (i.e. artificially 
constrained) policies. A framing effect refers to the influence of 
the manner in which options are presented upon the choices made. 
As Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky summarize, these 
" [f}ormulation effects can occur fortuitously, without anyone being 
aware of the impact of the frame on the ultimate decision. They can 
also be exploited deliberately to manipulate the relative attractiveness 
of options. "35 A series of experiments have shown, for example, how 
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 419 (2004) [hereinafter 
9/11 COMMISSION) . In response, the 9/11 Commission called for strengthened congressional 
oversight of both intelligence and homeland security. Id. Regarding oversight of intelligence, 
it proposed use of either a joint committee modeled on the example of the Joint Committee 
on Atomic Energy or a single committee in each house that combined authorizing and 
appropriating authorities. Regarding oversight of homeland security, the 9/11 Commission 
called for Congress to "create a single, principal point of oversight and review for homeland 
security." Id. at 421. 
34. A framing effect takes place if " the very same choice can be perceived as a gain or a 
loss based purely on its formal presentation." Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: 
Cognitive Perspective on Pain and Suffering Awards, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 259, 262 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) [hereinafter BEHAVIORAL LA w AND 
ECONOMICS]. As an example, "individuals will perceive a penalty for using credit cards as a 
loss and a bonus for using cash as a gain; this will lead individuals to use cash if and only if 
the 'penalty' tack is taken, although the two situations are, from an economic and end-state 
perspective, identical." Id. 
35. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, in CHOICES, 
v ALVES, AND FRAMES 1 ,  10 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000). 
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framing questions in different ways leads people to different answers. 36 
Outside of social psychology, the idea of framing effects has already 
influenced work in behavioral law and economics and other areas 
of jurisprudence. 37 
In this light, Heymann can be seen as proposing in a descriptive 
sense that policymakers' adoption of "war" as a frame will cause them 
in turn to favor certain options in responding to terrorism. He also 
implies in a normative sense that "war" as a frame leads to poor 
choices and suboptimal outcomes. In response to the shortcomings of 
this frame, Heymann, at least implicitly, presents the reader with his 
categories of choice. The message is that no single instrument such as 
war will be an adequate response to terrorism due to the complexity 
and uncertainty of the threat and the tradeoffs that each 
choice presents. 
Other scholars have observed that the conceptual lens or 
perspective with which one views a crisis or other complex set of 
policy choices substantially influences one's perceptions. For example, 
a classic study of governmental decisionmaking, Essence of Decision, 
supports Heymann's suspicion of any single perspective in evaluating 
complex areas of policy. In this book, Graham Allison and Phillip 
Zelikow examine historical questions concerning decisionmaking 
during the Cuban missile crisis. 38 This event was the conflict between 
the United States and the Soviet Union in October 1962 caused by the 
latter nation's construction of missile bases in Cuba. 
Allison and Zelikow evaluate the merits of three scholarly 
methodologies in understanding governmental decisionmaking during 
this crisis. They term these methodologies: (1) the Rational Actor 
Model (a nation is a purposive actor); (2) the Organizational Behavior 
Model (a nation is a large organization with "outputs" resulting from 
"existing organizational structures, procedures, and repertoires" and 
(3) the Governmental Politics Model (a nation acts as a result of 
"bargaining games among players in the national government"). 39 
Allison and Zellikow evaluate these methodologies by applying them 
seriatim to the Cuban missile cri sis and considering the extent to 
which these scholarly approaches help us understand different aspects 
of governmental decision-making during this event. 
In assessing the Cuban missile crisis, the two scholars find that no 
single model provides an adequate lens for understanding this event. 
36. ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 129-30 (7th ed. 1995); w. Kip Viscusi, 
Alarmist Decisions with Divergent Risk Information, 107 ECON. J. 1657 (1997). 
37. See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in 
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 34, at 13, 13-40. 
38. Phillip Zellikow also served as the Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission and is 
as a member of the Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security. 
39. ALLISON & ZELLIKOW, supra note 3, at 6. 
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Allison and Zellikow propose, " [t]he glasses one wears magnify one 
set of factors rather than another in ways that have multifarious 
consequences."40 At the end, their conclusion is that "a partial, ad hoc 
working synthesis of analysis using these three models" is needed.41 In 
a similar fashion, although applying his lens prospectively to 
decisionmaking rather than retrospectively to a complex historical 
event, Heymann calls for use of a broad taxonomy of possible 
responses. In his judgment, the policy decision as to which elements to 
use is to be shaped around emerging information about the nature of 
specific threats. 
Thus, Heymann's methodology sounds much like Allison and 
Zellikow's approach as political scientists, which favors a synthesis of 
analytical approaches over any one methodology.42 At the same time, 
however, Allison and Zellikow's insights could also be read as 
providing support for retaining the "war" metaphor at least as one of 
several instruments co-residing in the toolbag of policy responses.4 3 
After all, even the concept of the cold war included use of the "war" 
metaphor - indeed, the very term "cold war" incorporated it by 
reference. Finally, an important advantage of the synthesis approach is 
that it may lead to consideration of the different kinds of wars and the 
varied responses to these struggles throughout American history. 
II. THE PROMISE AND POTENTIAL PERIL OF NETWORKED 
INTELLIGENCE 
A major policy debate post-9/11 centers on the need to transform 
the USIC. An organizational aspect of this discussion received intense 
congressional, executive-branch, policy community, and media 
attention; this question concerned whether the USIC should be 
40. Id. at 387. 
41. See id. at 389. 
42. Allison and Zellikow also briefly discuss prospective use of their approach. Id. at 
397-402. They apply all three models to the task of assessing the threats that nuclear 
weapons pose for Americans today, and conclude: "Our judgment is that the direct nuclear 
threat to Americans has increased - increased substantially. If radical rethinking of the 
risks of nuclear war today diverges this dramatically from accepted wisdom, how much more 
so on issues of less ultimate importance?" Id. at 401. 
43. Jeffrey Rosen suggests, however, that "people have difficulty coolly appraising the 
risks of especially frightening threats." JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING 
SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN ANXIOUS AGE 74 (2004). Behavioral economics and social 
psychology has shown that "in making decisions about unfamiliar events, people rely on 
mental shortcuts, or heuristics, that often lead them to miscalculate the probability of 
especially dreaded hazards." Id. From this perspective, one might argue that use of the 
"war" metaphor added to the powerful saliency of terrorism will lead to clouded judgments. 
On the other hand, use of the "cold war" metaphor, at least arguably, did not seem to have 
provided a similarly flawed heuristic. 
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reorganized in order to place a single official in charge of all 
intelligence functions, and whether this office should have full 
authority over all elements of the USIC. This idea follows a proposal 
of the 9/11 Commission, which suggested that the Director of Central 
Intelligence (DCI), who historically has led the CIA but not had line 
authority over the Department of Defense's intelligence elements, be 
replaced with a Director of National Intelligence (DNI).44 The debate 
culminated with the enactment of the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA),4 5 which established a 
DNI to serve as head of the USIC, to act as the principal adviser to the 
President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security 
Council for intelligence matters related to the national security, and to 
oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence 
Program. The IRTPA specifies the budget, transfer and 
reprogramming of funds, transfer of personnel, tasking of national 
intelligence, analysis, and other authorities of the DNl.46 
Another important debate has focused on the proposals to 
increase the ways in which intelligence information is shared within 
the USIC. The IRTPA vests in the DNI the "principal authority to 
ensure maximum availability of and access to intelligence information 
within the intelligence community consistent with national security."47 
Agreement exists, as reflected in the IRTPA, on the need to create a 
new intelligence network that will improve the quality of intelligence 
information and, in turn, increase access to the intelligence located in 
this system.48 There is far less agreement on what this network should 
do or how to construct it. Thus, the debate about information sharing 
will continue. 
In Part II of this Review, we first discuss Heymann's vision of why 
and how intelligence should be used more intensely to thwart 
terrorism. We then describe the contours of the proposed new kind of 
intelligence network. The new intelligence network will, however, 
create new policy issues - including difficult privacy challenges. We 
will also explore the IRTPA's new statutory standards throughout this 
Part to indicate the current state of the law for these policy issues. 
44. 9/11 COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 411 .  
45. Intelligence Reform & Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004, Pub. L .  No. 108-
458, 1 18 Stat. 3638 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 8 U.S.C., 22 
U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 46 U.S.C., 49 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C.) . 
46. Id. § 1011 .  
47. Id. 
48. 9/1 1  COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 418-19. 
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A. Heymann on Improving Intelligence 
1465 
As noted, Heymann fears the emergence of an intelligence state in 
the United States. At the same time, however, he exhorts the 
government to collect better intelligence, perform better intelligence 
analysis, and make better use of intelligence (pp. 63-71). In other 
words, Heymann wants the USIC to improve what it does without 
becoming more threatening to civil liberties or less law abiding. 
The intelligence needed is of two types: First, strategic intelligence 
about terrorist organizations is required to inform U.S. authorities 
about the capabili ties, resources, and nature of our enemies. Second, 
tactical intelligence is necessary; this "intelligence [is] specific enough 
to allow prevention by incapacitating a critical group of the terrorists 
or denying them the resources or access their plan requires" (p. 62). 
Heymann argues: "Producing extremely effective intelligence at home 
and abroad requires better gathering of information, better 
combination of information from different sources, and greater 
imagination in drawing conclusions from an incomplete set of 
pieces" (p. 64). 
In thinking about the necessary role of intelligence, Heymann 
develops another useful taxonomy. He observes that intelligence can 
prevent a terrorist attack either by identifying a few suspects and then 
uncovering their cohorts and their plan, or by detecting a terrorist plan 
and then identifying a critical core of participants (p. 65). In our 
terminology, the first approach is an "individual-focused strategy," 
and the second, a "plan-focused strategy." The primary difficulty with 
an individual-focused strategy is in identifying the ini tial persons to 
investigate. As an intelligence matter, a terrorist group may well seek 
to recruit persons whom the USIC generally would not suspect (p. 67). 
At the same time, moreover, a democratic society requires a factual 
predicate before applying the investigative powers of the state against 
an individual. 
Conceptual and practical difficulties also exist with a plan-focused 
approach. Heymann writes that for particularly likely targets and 
terrorist resources, the United States could develop possible scenarios 
and lists of indicators that terrorists were acting on one of those 
scenarios. He suggests that the United States could construct hundreds 
of these models and constantly look for evidence that terrorists were 
implementing these designs (p. 74). This effort, of course, requires 
great insight, creativity, and imagination to transcend scenarios based 
purely on historical events or on existing and perhaps incomplete 
intelligence. Here, Heymann is bringing us squarely up against a 
nearly inescapable post-9/11 fact: the success of individual-focused and 
plan-focused strategies alike seems to require substantial increases in 
intelligence collection, processing, and sharing. Through access to and 
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analysis of comprehensive, accurate, and timely information, both 
strategies will develop hypotheses and then test the results. But these 
expanded activities also raise concerns about potentially monitoring 
activities of innocent Americans as well as the related problem of 
false positives. 
Despite these risks, Heymann remains a proponent of information­
based methods of counterterrorism. Heymann calls for timely sharing 
of information within the intelligence community and improved 
computer capacity, in particular at the FBI.49 He also hopes for greater 
cooperation in gathering intelligence abroad from "the law 
enforcement and internal security forces of states where the terrorist 
organizations are operating." 50 In addition, Heymann wants more 
electronic analysis of information, such as through data mining. The 
concept of data mining can have different meanings in different 
contexts. Here we wish to draw on the definitions of the Department 
of Defense's TAPAC. This study panel noted that data mining can 
take two different forms: it can be pattern-based or subject-based. 
These categories track our terminology regarding plan-focused and 
individual-focused strategies for intelligence. 
In pattern-based data mining, the government investigator 
develops a model of assumptions about activities and underlying 
characteristics of culpable individuals or about the harbingers and 
indicators of terrorist plans. The government official then searches 
databases containing personal information for "hits" that indicate the 
possible presence of such culpable individuals or terrorist plans. Data 
mining can also be subject-based, which involves looking for 
information about a specific individual or links to known individuals. 
Heymann is most interested in pattern-based data mining. He 
notes that it is to be used to "look for suspicious combinations of 
information, hoping they will produce a greatly reduced field of 
suspects" {pp. 72-73). As an example of data mining, Heymann 
discusses the German example of using demographic and economic 
data to identify possible members of terrorist groups and points to the 
German Criminal Procedure Code's specific statutory authorization of 
such data mining (pp. 70-71). Heymann also refers to a report of the 
Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security ("Markle Task 
Force"), which argues that the USIC could have identified all of the 
9/11 hijackers if it had only drawn on "readily available, relatively 
public information,'' and then carried out adequate data analysis, such 
as checking all purchasers of airplane tickets to see if they were either 
49. He notes of the period prior to 9/11, "(t]he FBI was computer-challenged." P. 63. 
50. P. 79. Heymann observes, however, significant limits likely exist on the United 
States' capacity to elicit this cooperation. Id. 
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on watch lists or shared addresses or other ties with persons on 
watch lists.51 
Successfully applying many hypotheses against data on a 
continuing basis requires intensive probing of databases containing 
potentially sensitive personal information and continuously 
repopulating those databases with new information. Heymann 
recognizes that using high-powered computers to combine readily 
available information and to select a group of individuals for further 
investigation affects the privacy and anonymity of all (pp. 103-04) . He 
observes that this technique would lead, for each individual in the 
United States, to a larger file of personal information maintained by 
the government, more frequent government checks of this file, less 
ability to separate oneself from one's recorded history, and a system 
that is designed to scrutinize the individual's recent activities 
whenever old records about the individual are checked.52 Heymann 
seems largely willing to accept these costs; he states that " [i]n creating 
new files for preventive purposes, we will be changing the traditional 
balance between law enforcement and internal security . . . .  [O]ur 
level of acceptance of domestic intelligence activities has changed and 
will continue to change" (p. 104) . 
At this time, several governmental programs are either researching 
data mining or carrying out some variants of it. A baseline for its use 
has also been proposed, namely, in the T APAC recommendations.53 
This blue ribbon panel, chaired by Newton Minow, carried out a study 
of data mining and, in its final report of March 2004, called for 
Congress and the President to enact a "framework of legal, 
technological, training, and oversight mechanisms necessary to 
guarantee the privacy of U.S. persons in the context of national 
security and law enforcement activities."54 
What are the proposed elements of the TAP AC framework? To 
begin with, TAP AC drew a distinction, as we have noted above, 
between pattern-based and subject-based data mining. In pattern­
based data mining, the government first develops a model of patterns 
51. Pp. 56-59; MARKLE FOUND. TASK FORCE, PROTECTING AMERICA'S FREEDOM IN 
THE INFORMATION AGE 27-30 (2002) , available at http://www.markletaskforce.org/ 
documents/Markle_Full_Report.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2005). 
52. P. 104. In a similar fashion, Jeffrey Rosen has termed data mining, "mass 
dataveillance - which involves scanning the personal data of millions of citizens who have 
not been identified as suspicious in the hope of preventing terrorism before it occurs." 
ROSEN, supra note 43, at 22-23. 
53. TECH. AND PRIVACY ADVISORY COMM. ,  U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., SAFEGUARDING 
PRIVACY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM (Mar. 2004) [hereinafter TAP AC REPORT] , 
available at http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/20040300tapac.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 
2005). 
54. Id. at xiv. 
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of terrorist activity and then examines databases to identify people 
that match these patterns. In the subject-based variant, the 
government searches data banks looking for information about a 
specific individual or links to known individuals. 5 5  Existing law already 
places some safeguards on data-mining, with more emphasis to date 
on regulating subject-based data mining. In the discussion to follow, 
we therefore concentrate on pattern-based data mining, which raises 
more novel and complex policy issues. 5 6  
TAP AC urged adoption of a framework with six elements to 
regulate pattern-based data mining. This framework is to be utilized 
before an agency employs data mining with the personal data of U.S. 
citizens: 
• a written authorization from the agency head that includes a 
determination that a number of substantive standards have been 
met; 
• minimum technical requirements (including data minimalization, 
data anonymization, audit trail, data security, and training for 
governmental officials); 
• special protections for data mining involving databases from 
other governmental agencies or from private industry; 
• authorization from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(FISC) before engaging in data mining that involves personal 
data concerning U.S. citizens that has not been anonymized, or 
reidentifying previously anonymized information concerning U.S. 
citizens; 
• regular compliance audits; and 
• creation of a policy-level privacy officer at the DOD. 57 
55. As TAP AC notes, moreover, the line between these two approaches can be blurred: 
"The broader the search criteria, and the more people other than actual terrorists who will 
be identified by those criteria, the more pattern-like these searches become." Nevertheless, 
the distinction between the two types of data mining has value, and we adopt it. Id. at 45. 
56. Indeed, the key protection inherent in subject-based data mining is that it will 
require some individualized suspicion before it can proceed. In a report highly critical of 
data mining in general, the ACLU seemed to acknowledge the validity of data searches 
based on working from known leads and suspects. As it stated: "Working outward from 
known leads is not only more effective, but is also compatible with an entire body of law that 
has grown up over hundreds of years to prevent abuses by all-too-human investigators." 
ACLU, THE SURVEILLANCE-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 30 (Aug. 2004) [hereinafter ACLU, 
SURVEILLANCE COMPLEX]. 
57. TAPAC REPORT, supra note 53, at 48-60. The TAPAC excluded certain kinds of 
data mining from its recommendations. These were: "data mining (1) based on 
particularized suspicion . . .  ; (2) that is limited to foreign intelligence that does not involve 
U.S. persons; or (3) that concerns federal government employees in connection with their 
employment." Id. at 49. A final carve out concerned data mining based on information "that 
is routinely available without charge or subscription to the public," such as information on 
the Internet or in telephone directories. Id. at 46-48. 
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The TAP AC proposals and accompanying report provide a thoughtful 
response to the privacy dangers of data mining. We wish to make two 
further points: (1) the urgent need to solve basic data management 
and network issues; and (2) the proper role of the judiciary. 
If data mining is to be used, it will be even more important to end 
the government's current problems with database and network 
management. As widespread publicity has demonstrated, for example, 
the current airport watchlist system is dysfunctional. 58 Perhaps the 
most notable example of its shortcomings: Senator Ted K ennedy's 
revelation at a Senate hearing that he appeared on a federal "no fly" 
list . 59 Other news stories have detailed Representative Don Young's 
similar difficulties in flying and "the more than 2,000 people who have 
complained about such mix-ups to the Transportation Security 
Administration."60 Moreover, the government's advice to travelers 
does not inspire confidence; it has suggested that passengers who have 
been placed on an airport watch list try to avoid it by using "middle 
initials, middle names, or even suffixes such as 'Jr."'61 If this technique 
works for the innocent, one wonders if it will not also be of assistance 
to terrorists. 
The IRPT A directly addresses the difficulties with airport watch 
lists. First, it requires the Transportation Security Administration 
("TSA") to "commence testing of an advanced passenger 
prescreening system that will allow the Department of Homeland 
Security to assume the performance of comparing passenger 
58. Keith L. Alexander, A Common Name Can Be a Curse (Oct. 12, 2004), at 
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6232745; Christopher Elliott, Getting Off a Security Watch List Is 
the Hard Part, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2004, at CS. Difficulties also exist with consolidation of 
other watch lists within government, with the Government Accounting Office and others 
criticizing the Department of Homeland Security for failing to improve cooperation among 
different governmental agencies. Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities, 
Challenges, and Key Management Issues: Testimony Before the Comm. on Gov't Reform, 
108th Cong. 31-32 (2003) [hereinafter Information Sharing Responsibilities] (statement of 
Robert F. Dacey, Director of Info. Sec. Issues, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, and Randolph 
C. Hite, Director, Info. Tech. Architecture and Sys. Issues, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office), at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03715t.pdf; DAVID HEYMAN & JAMES J. CARAFANO, DHS 
2.0: RETHINKING THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 22 (2004) (improvements in 
watchlists should include authorities and processes to correct errors, enhancing 
interoperability of information across agencies, and regular review and oversight), 
available at www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/loader .cfm ?url=/commonspot/ 
security/getfile.cfm&PagelD=72759 (last visited Mar. 9, 2005); Brock N. Meeks, Goal of 
Unified Terrorist Watch List Still Elusive (Mar. 25, 2004), at http://www .msnbc.msn.com/ 
id/4603586; see also ACLU, SURVEILLANCE COMPLEX, supra note 56, at 19 ("An entire 
archipelago of government-enforced watch lists has been created haphazardly and without 
the carefully constructed checks and balances that such a powerful instrument demands."). 
59. Rachel L. Swarns, Senator? Terrorist? A Watch List Stops Kennedy at Airport, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 20, 2004, at Al. 
60. Alexander, supra note 58. 
61. Id. 
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information . . .  to the automatic selectee and no fly lists, utilizing all 
appropriate records in the consolidated and integrated terrorist 
watchlist maintained by the Federal Government."6 2 Beyond 
mandating a new prescreening system, the statute requires the TSA to 
establish a procedure for appeals by "airline passengers, who are 
delayed or prohibited from boarding a flight because the advanced 
prescreening system determined that they might pose a security 
threat. "63 The great challenge will be in getting the details right as 
government establishes this appeal process, seeks to prevent "a large 
number of false positives," and creates an effective and accurate 
passenger prescreening system.64 One critical issue is how many false 
positives should be considered excessive. These initiatives on their 
face, of course, do not address problems with other kinds of watch lists 
maintained by the federal government. 
Beyond the watch lists, the federal government has struggled with 
other database issues. For example, the FBI continues to have 
difficulties with its internal computing system. It has even abandoned 
a $170 million project that would have allowed FBI agents to 
electronically manage criminal and terrorism files.65 If the government 
has such problems in managing databases and in handling other 
elementary computing tasks, one wonders how well it will carry out 
pattern-based data mining.66 The danger is that this activity will 
magnify problems that already exist with data errors, poor data 
integration (names recorded in different ways in different records), 
and data security (the danger that the personal data will be 
misappropriated or otherwise compromised). 
Data mining may also increase the dangers that flow from false 
positives.67 At present, however, even the simple issue of getting off an 
airport watch list is unresolved. As the New York Times reported: 
62. IRTPA, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 4012, 118 Stat. 3638, 3714-19 (2004). 
63. IRTPA § 4012(a), 1 18  Stat. at 3715. 
64. Id. 
65. Erich Lichtblau, F.B.I. Ends a Faltering Effort to Overhaul Computer Software, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2005, at Al3; Erich Lichtblau, F.B.l. May Scrap Vital Overhaul for 
Computers ,  N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2005, at Al; FBI May Scrap $1 70 Million Project (Jan. 13, 
2005),  at www.cnn.com/2005/US/Ol/13/fbi.software/. 
66. The GAO has also issued a series of reports and provided Congressional testimony 
regarding information sharing weaknesses at the Department of Homeland Security. See 
Information Sharing Responsibilities, supra note 58; U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., REP. NO. GA0-
03-760, HOMELAND SECURITY: EFFORTS TO IMPROVE INFORMATION SHARING NEED TO 
BE STRENGTHENED (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03760.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 9, 2005). 
67. The TAPAC calls upon the agency head to state, among other things, that "the 
system yields a rate of false positives that is acceptable in view of the purpose of the search, 
the severity of the effect of being identified, and the likelihood of further investigation; and 
that there is a system in place for dealing with false positives . . .  including identifying the 
frequency and effects of false positives." TAP AC REPORT, supra note 53, at 50. 
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"There is no way to find out if you are on the list until you check in for 
a flight. Worse, there may be no way off ."68 
Our second observation about data mining concerns the proper 
role of the judiciary. The TAPAC recommendation calls for 
authorization from the FISC before the government engages in 
pattern-based data mining that involves personal data concerning U.S. 
citizens that has not been anonymized, or before the government re­
identifies previously anonymized information concerning U.S 
citizens.69 Regarding this proposal, we agree with a requirement of 
FISC approval for this kind of data mining, but only if it involves 
surveillance activities conducted under the PISA, the statute that 
governs the conduct of certain foreign intelligence activities within the 
United States. This statute only applies, however, if a specific set of 
statutory predicates, such as a tie to a foreign power, are fulfilled.70 
Yet, the TAP AC proposal does not make the case for extending 
PISC jurisdiction over data mining that would not otherwise fall 
under PISA.71 
While much is to be said in favor of judicial approval of pattern­
based data mining, there are potentially significant drawbacks to 
expanding PISC jurisdiction. First, given the range of information 
likely to be involved in data mining, the PISC will typically not have 
authorized initial collection of the data that will be mined. Second, the 
FISC is unlikely to have particular expertise in the legal issues relating 
to data mining except insofar as they relate to PISA. Third, the 
purpose of the data mining may not be related to foreign intelligence 
- it may be for law enforcement, protective, or other public 
safety purposes. 
As a consequence of these factors, our preference is to locate the 
responsibility for non-PISA pattern-based data mining somewhere 
other than with FISC. Possible options include placing authority over 
this data mining with a traditional Article Ill court or with a special 
oversight court, made up of Article Ill judges, as Jeffrey Rosen has 
proposed.72 Such a court must be able to develop expertise in the issue 
68. Elliot, supra note 58, at CS. 
69. TAPAC REPORT, supra note 53, at 47; see PHILLIP B. HEYMANN & JULIETTE N. 
KAYYEM, LONG-TERM LEGAL STRATEGY PROJECT FOR PRESERVING SECURITY AND 
DEMOCRATIC FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 79 (2004) (calling for a "federal 
district court or a specialized court," such as the FISA court, to be used to issue warrants 
when federal government seeks "access to extensive systems of commercial and other third­
party records"), available at http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/LTLS_ 
finalreport.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2005). 
70. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2001). 
71. See TAP AC REPORT, supra note 53, at 47. 
72. ROSEN, supra note 43, at 121. 
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of data mmmg and inspire the confidence of Congress and the 
public alike. 
As a final point, we wish to note that the underlying value of 
pattern-based data mining is far from uncontested. Bruce Schneier is 
perhaps the leading voice among the technologists who have cast 
doubt on its efficacy.7 3 Moreover, in Germany, where there is a track 
record with its use, law enforcement has yet to mark significant 
successes with it.74 Further refinement of data mining technology and 
techniques may, however, improve it. The national debate about data 
mining has only begun. 
B.  Building the New Intelligence Networks: The Task Ahead 
A further policy issue related to data mining concerns the way that 
intelligence agencies' information is disseminated and worked on 
within the USIC. Heymann has called, albeit at a high level of 
generality, for improved collection and greater sharing of information 
(pp. 61-66) . The 9/11 Commission has struck a similar chord, and 
demanded "a greater unity of effort" in sharing information.7 5 The 
Markle Task Force has offered perhaps the most detailed and 
enthusiastic recommendation concerning the need for a new 
intelligence network.76 We will sketch the proposed form of this 
network and then analyze four policy questions that the new 
information sharing paradigm raises. Before doing so, however, we 
wish to touch upon the intelligence generation process, if only to 
emphasize the distinction between: (1) the information that an 
intelligence agency itself may lawfully collect and retain; and (2) the 
intelligence reports that the agency prepares and distributes based on 
this information. 
In the course of performing its lawful activities against foreign 
intelligence targets, an intelligence agency collects much more 
73. BRUCE SCHNEIER, BEYOND FEAR: THINKING SENSIBLY ABOUT SECURITY IN AN 
UNCERTAIN WORLD 253-54 (2003); see also ACLU, SURVEILLANCE COMPLEX, supra note 
56, at 23 ("[D]ata mining has never been validated as a method for catching terrorists."). 
74. As an example, a post 9/11 judicially authorized data mining operation using 
personal data of students at colleges and universities in Hessen appears to have led to no 
useful leads. See Der Hessische Datenschutzbeauftragte, 32. T!itigkeitsbericht 26-29 (2003); 
Der Hessische Datenschutzbeauftragte, 31. Tlitigkeitsbericht 16-20 (2002). German law 
enforcement authorities also used data mining extensively in tracking the Red Army Faction 
with, at best, mixed results. For fascinating German accounts of Horst Herold, the German 
"father of data mining," see Dieter Schenk, DER CHEF: HORST HEROLD UNO DAS BKA 
(2002), and Dorothea Hauser, Der Kriminalphilosoph, DIE ZEIT, Oct. 23, 2003, Nr. 44, at 
http://www.zeit.de/2003/44/H_Herold. 
75. 9/11 COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 417-19. 
76. MARKLE FOUND. TASK FORCE, CREATING A TRUSTED INFORMATION NETWORK 
FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 1 (2003), available at http://www.markletaskforce.org/ 
reports!TFNS_Report2_Master.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2005). 
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information than it disseminates. Legal authorities, including statutes, 
executive orders, and guidelines and regulations promulgated by the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, the Attorney General, and 
other governmental entities regulate whether an agency may retain, 
analyze, and use this information. For both legal reasons and practical 
reasons, intelligence agencies have not disseminated the immediate 
results of their collection activities (so-called "raw intelligence") to 
policymakers and other intelligence consumers.77 Instead, members of 
the USIC analyze that information, and prepare and disseminate 
reports in various formats for different intelligence users with diverse 
needs and different level of security clearances. 
In the USIC's traditional approach, intelligence agencies are 
"stovepiped," which means they keep much of the immediate results 
of their intelligence collection activities within their own institutional 
structure.78 To be sure, each intelligence production agency shares its 
reports with both intelligence users and intelligence analysts who draw 
upon various sources to form analytic conclusions, such as analysts 
within the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence. Yet, entities within the 
USIC historically have not shared the raw intelligence underlying the 
factual assertions and analytic conclusions set forth in their reports 
with outside agencies.79 As the 9/11 Commission has noted, the 
established culture of the USIC is centered on restricting access to 
information rather than distributing it. The 9/11 Commission stated: 
"Agencies uphold a 'need-to-know' culture of information protection 
rather than promoting a 'need-to-share' culture of integration."80 
To be sure, calls for heightened information sharing have been 
made in the past.81 Yet, there is more urgency to the recent calls for 
constructing a new intelligence network to facilitate information 
sharing. One reason for this urgency is, as the 9/11 Commission 
Report chronicles, the terrible events of 9/11 and the failure of the 
77. Id. at 1 1-15. See generally GREGORY F. TREVERTON, RESHAPING NATIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE IN AN AGE OF INFORMATION 4 (2001) ("[R]agged cooperation is a feature of 
U.S. intelligence as old as the attack on Pearl Harbor."). 
78. 9/11 COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 403, 400-10; MARKLE FOUND. TASK FORCE, 
supra note 76, at 2. 
79. In other words, intelligence agencies typically have been willing to share their 
released reports with qualified recipients, and even measure their success in part by the 
value that these recipients attach to the intelligence reports, but agencies have been 
reluctant to permit other intelligence agencies and policymakers unconstrained or recurring 
access to their raw intelligence. 9/11 COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 416-17. 
80. 9/11 COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 417 (footnote omitted). 
81. See, e.g. , COUNTERING THE CHANGING THREAT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM : 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORISM 16 (2000) (FBI should "develop 
terrorism and foreign intelligence information obtained at field offices and headquarters for 
prompt dissemination to other agencies"; Attorney General should "direct maximum 
dissemination of terrorist-related information."). 
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USIC to connect the dots and identify the terrorists despite tantalizing 
hints and available pieces of intelligence data.82 These hints and data 
were sometimes held within the individual agency stovepipes and 
sometimes were located in non-USIC databases that might have been 
combined with data held by the USIC.8 3 
A second reason for the new urgency behind the calls for a new 
intelligence network is the greater experience of policymakers and the 
public with enterprise computer networks and the Internet for nearly 
instantaneous information exchange and collaboration. Put another 
way, a senator who is able to determine with a few keystrokes or 
mouse clicks the location of a package that an online merchant is 
shipping to her by express courier might well wonder why an 
intelligence analyst cannot extract raw intelligence on demand from 
another part of the USIC. The greater awareness of technologies for 
data sharing has contributed to pressure to modernize the structure 
and processes by which U.S. intelligence agencies work with each 
other and with other agencies. 
Four sets of policy obstacles must be overcome, however, if the 
new intelligence network is to be built and if it is to operate 
successfully. These obstacles are the general reluctance of components 
of the USIC to share information; the huge amount of intelligence 
information to be networked; the need to differentiate among degrees 
of permissible access to these data; and, finally, the new risks 
to privacy interests. We will now describe and assess these 
policy challenges. 
1 .  Reluctance to Share Raw Intelligence Information 
First, as noted, USIC agencies generally have been hesitant to 
share raw intelligence information. This reluctance has numerous 
grounds, including concerns that releasing this information would 
compromise intelligence sources and methods; the difficulties of 
constructing secure means of access and distribution for data that are 
held in many different forms in many different locations; and perhaps 
an almost proprietary feeling that other agencies would not have the 
appropriate expertise to interpret the raw intelligence and should 
rely upon the originating agency's reports and interpretations.84 
Historically, to greater or lesser degrees, bureaucratic rivalry has also 
82. Id. at 254-77. As the 9/11 Commission summarized: "The U.S. government was 
unable to capitalize on mistakes made by al Qaeda. Time ran out." Id. at 277. 
83. Id. at 268-77. 
84. For the FBI's history on this issue, see AUDIT DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AUDIT 
REP. NO. 04-10, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE 
SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE AND OTHER INFORMATION (2003), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/audit/FBI/0410/final.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2005). 
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existed between intelligence agencies, each concerned that another 
agency's access to its investigative materials or raw intelligence might 
enable the second agency to use that information and thereby either 
get the credit for producing a vital intelligence insight or inadvertently 
interfere with an ongoing intelligence operation being conducted by 
the agency that originated the information.85 
While these tendencies have receded to some extent since 9/11 ,  
they have not entirely disappeared. I t  will take time and continuing 
effort to overcome the institutional, cultural, and bureaucratic 
elements working against the construction of a new intelligence 
network and to adopt a new mindset, namely, what the 9/11 
Commission calls the "need-to-share" approach.86 Government 
policymakers are already drawing on the imperative of preventing 
future terrorist attacks in renewed efforts to change the traditional 
restrictive culture regarding the sharing of raw intelligence 
information. In an Executive Order of August 27, 2004, for example, 
President Bush charged executive-branch agencies with planning for 
the establishment of an interoperable terrorism information sharing 
environment to facilitate sharing of terrorism information.87 
More recently, Congress codified this requirement in the IRTPA.88 
First, the law established detailed requirements for the Information 
Sharing Council already established by President Bush, including a 
requirement for "a decentralized, distributed, and coordinated 
environment."89 This law also called for intelligence information to be 
"provided in its most shareable form" and for the "heads of Federal 
departments and agencies to promote a culture of information 
sharing."90 In brief, the Executive Order and the IRTPA articulate a 
clear mandate to share.91 
85. See 9/1 1 COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 417 (noting the existence of a "culture of 
agencies feeling they own the information they gathered"). 
86. Id. 
87. Exec. Order No. 13,356, 69 Fed. Reg. 53,599, 53,600-01 (Sept. 1, 2004). 
88. IRTPA, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 1016, 118 Stat. 3638, 3664-70 (2004). 
89. IRTP A § 1016(b )(2), 118 Stat. at 3665-66. 
90. IRTPA § 1016(d)(l), (3), 1 18 Stat. at 3666. 
91. Exec. Order No. 13,356, 69 Fed. Reg. 53,589 (Sept. 1, 2004). This Executive Order 
established an Information Systems Council ("ISC"); as the Order states, "The mission of 
the Council is to plan for the establishment of an interoperable terrorism sharing 
environment to facilitate automated sharing of terrorism information among appropriate 
agencies." The ISC is to be chaired by a designee of the Office of Management of Budget 
and to have representatives from the CIA, FBI, Department of Homeland Security, 
Department of Justice, and the National Counterterrorism Center. Congress codified and 
established specific duties for the ISC in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004. See IRTPA § 1016(g), 118 Stat. at 3668-69. 
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The 9/11 Commission has also pointed to a need "to find a way of 
routinizing, even bureaucratizing, the exercise of imagination."92 To do 
so, one must foster an atmosphere that encourages dissent and 
competing analytic hypotheses within the USIC. The executive branch 
already expressed this judgment in 1981 in Executive Order 12,333, 
which calls for a "[m]aximum emphasis" on "fostering analytical 
competition among appropriate elements of the Intelligence 
Community."9 3 Similarly, the IRTPA requires the DNI to ensure that 
USIC elements "regularly conduct competitive analysis of analytic 
products, whether such products are produced by or disseminated to 
such elements. "94 
The difficult issue is how to foster this competition; the task 
involves changes in the recognition, awards, and promotion criteria for 
personnel within the USIC to place greater emphasis on the sharing of 
information with other agencies. In addition, the developing and 
testing of unorthodox interpretations will need to be encouraged. 
Gregory Treverton and others have called, for example, for "red 
teaming" by the USIC, in which intelligence simulates potential foes 
and seeks to get "inside the heads and strategies of would-be 
foes."95 The IRTPA specifically adopts this suggestion; it requires 
"alternative analysis of intelligence."96 The statute calls on the DNI to 
"establish a process and assign an individual or entity the 
responsibility for ensuring that, as appropriate, elements of the 
intelligence community conduct alternative analysis (commonly 
referred to as 'red-team analysis') of the information and conclusions 
in intelligence products."97 
If separate teams of analysts are to review information, including 
raw intelligence data, to reach their own analytic judgments, they will 
also need access to the full range of available information, even if held 
outside their home agency. Thus, assuming analytic competition is to 
be institutionalized, it will provide another impetus for widespread 
sharing of information. 
2. Huge Volume of Intelligence Information 
Second, huge volumes of intelligence information already exist and 
will only increase due to heightened intelligence activity post-9/11. 
Some intelligence information is held in central locations, and some of 
92. 9/11 COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 344. 
93. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, 201 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (2000). 
94. IRTPA § 1011 ,  1 18 Stat. at 3651. 
95. TREVERTON, supra note 77, at 38. 
96. IRTPA § 1017(a), 118 Stat. at 3670. 
97. Id. 
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it is held at the perimeter, such as in FBI field offices. The sheer 
volume and decentralization of this information causes difficulties for 
the intelligence community in networking the information, extracting 
meaning from it, and developing or testing hypotheses, i.e., applying 
an individual-based or plan-based heuristic to data to identify 
elements that humans should analyze further. 
Moreover, this information must be accessible not only to analysts 
and intelligence officers working on international terrorism, but also 
to those who are responsible for analyzing and acting against other 
related and difficult transnational threats, such as nuclear 
proliferation, illegal movements of aliens, and money laundering.98 
Related to the problem of sheer volume, technical standards must 
permit interoperability and accessibility to diverse forms of 
intelligence information.99 It is no small challenge to make these data 
available in compatible formats. 
Possible solutions to the problem of great volumes of information 
include one strategy that Heymann discusses, data mining, and one 
that he does not, namely, decentralized, peer to peer networks. We 
have already discussed data mining.100 As for decentralized networks, 
the Markle Task Force on National Security provides a conceptual 
framework for this approach.101 The new intelligence network is to be 
built around a series of decentralized nodes in which individual 
participants share information directly with one another. In contrast, 
the traditional hub-and-spoke model for information processing is 
based around a centralized mainframe system. The hope is that, in the 
best of all possible intelligence worlds, this model will permit both 
decentralized and centralized analysis.102 
Entities at the edges of the network, such as local and state law 
enforcement agencies, will be able to have access to specific 
information to help inform whatever specific problem they are facing. 
At the same time, Washington-based agencies responsible for forming 
a more integrated view of terrorist activities, such as the CIA and the 
National Counterterrorism Center, will have more centralized access 
to data.103 
98. TREVERTON, supra note 77, at 108. 
99. MARKLE FOUND. TASK FORCE, supra note 76, at 20-21. 
100. See supra Part II.A. 
101. MARKLE FOUND. TASK FORCE, supra note 76, at 20-21. 
102 Id. at 20-25. 
103. In an effort to improve integration of terrorist-related information supplied by 
various intelligence agencies, President Bush established the Terrorist Threat Integration 
Center ("TTIC"), an interagency center, in January 2003 to build an integrated analytic 
capability in analyzing and sharing information. News Release, White House, Fact Sheet: 
Strengthening Intelligence to Better Protect America (Feb. 14, 2003), at http://www. 
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3. Differing Degrees of Access 
A third challenge for the new network is finding a way to permit 
varying degrees of access to intelligence by various officials. For 
example, state and local law enforcement, emergency response 
officials, other governmental parties, and perhaps even private parties 
will have access to some information and not to other information -
even within a single data set. This technical problem is a difficult and 
multifaceted one whose solution involves multilevel security, strong 
user authentication protocols, careful database construction and 
configuration, discerning choices regarding network architecture, and 
audit records.104 
Moreover, a new intelligence network that is useful for individuals 
with a wide range of missions and security clearances requires 
continuous repopulation of that network's databases with useful 
information. Yet, the traditional way of providing information based 
on intelligence reports to individuals who do not have the requisite 
security clearances has been to "redact" or "sanitize" the classified 
intelligence reports to produce an unclassified version.105 The Markle 
Task Force has examined this issue in detail and pointed to a need to 
move away from "processes for 'sanitizing' classified information so 
that it can be shared with other agencies. "106 The Markle Task Force 
states: "The process needs to be reversed so that distributable 
products are created at the outset" and to permit such intelligence to 
be moved across security levels in appropriate fashion.107 
Note, however, that this problem is one that must also be resolved 
at a level beyond the technological, operational, and administrative: it 
has important policy implications. The USIC must habitually and 
instinctively generate appropriate information at the right levels of 
classification and then make it securely available to those and only 
those entities who are entitled to receive the information. As an 
illustration, New York City officials and the New York Police 
Department have registered objections post-9/11 to their lack of access 
to counterterrorism information that federal agencies hold. 108 The 9/11 
Commission's call for more access to intelligence by state and 
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02120030214-1.html. The Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 established a National Counterterrorism Center, § 1021, 
118 Stat. at 3672, and transferred the TTIC to this new entity, § 1092, 118 Stat. at 3697. 
104. See MARKLE FOUND. TASK FORCE, supra note 76, at 20-30. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 24. 
107. Id. 
108. Agreement has been reached, however, on cooperation in bio-terror investigations. 
See Judith Miller, City and F.B.l. Reach Accord on Bioterror Investigations, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 21,  2004, at 30. 
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local officials does not appear, at least thus far, to have had a 
significant impact.109 
4. New Privacy Threats 
Finally, the new intelligence network raises complex privacy issues. 
To understand them, one should first consider the established legal 
approach to privacy in the context of the USIC. This approach is 
largely structured around restrictions on the sharing of intelligence 
information. For example, FISA traditionally imposed obstacles that 
limited the sharing of intelligence between the USIC and law 
enforcement agencies. DOJ guidelines during the Clinton 
administration lowered the "wall" between the USIC and federal law 
enforcement; the USA PATRIOT Act further dismantled this 
border.110 Other privacy protections were largely unintended; 
stovepiping, incompatibility and lack of connectivity among agency 
information systems, and agency reluctance to share information, for 
example, created a "practical obscurity" for certain intelligence, and, 
hence, led to a degree of privacy protection for persons associated 
with that information.1 1 1  
The new intelligence network would certainly permit fewer 
occasions for any practical obscurity of data. Rather, this network's 
goal is to present distributable intelligence information in compatible 
formats to all authorized persons. As the Markle Task Force observed, 
the new approach will be "a culture of distribution."112 Yet, the 
109. 9/11 COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 416-19. 
110. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 
272 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). Under the FISA, prior to the 
October 2001 enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, the USIC was only permitted to 
conduct electronic surveillance and physical searches for intelligence purposes if the 
"purpose" was to obtain foreign intelligence. See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 
F.2d 908, 916 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1 144 (1982). Courts interpreted the 
statutory requirement regarding the foreign intelligence "purpose" to mean a "primary 
purpose" and not a sole or exclusive purpose. See, e.g., id. 
After the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, the USIC is now permitted to conduct 
electronic surveillance and physical searches so long as a significant purpose of the activity is 
to obtain foreign intelligence. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a)(7)(B) (2001). These 
provisions are subject to sunset clauses in the PATRIOT Act unless reenacted in 2005. USA 
PA TRI OT Act § 224, 115 Stat. at 295. In addition, under Attorney General Guidelines, 
approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Review Court, criminal investigators may 
now provide substantial input into the "initiation, operation, continuation or expansion" of 
an intelligence investigation. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 729 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 
2002), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 1615 (2003). 
111 .  The term "practical obscurity," used to refer to inadvertent privacy protections, 
originates in Justice Stevens' opinion in U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for 
Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 750 (1989). 
112. MARKLE FOUND. TASK FORCE, supra note 76, at 23. 
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dismantling of the wall between the USIC and law enforcement, which 
is in part a manifestation of the new culture of distribution, 
already has some observers concerned. For example, Peter Swire has 
raised a series of concerns about the removal of the "wall. "11 3 
Others are worried about the privacy implications of the new 
intelligence network.114 
Here, new ideas about oversight and safeguards, including audit 
trails, are needed. We also wish to return to one of the suggestions of 
the TAP AC, which was for creation of a policy-level privacy officer at 
the DOD.115 TAPAC also called for a panel of external advisors to 
assist in creating appropriate oversight of data mining activities.116 
These internal and external oversight mechanisms can also assist in 
assessment of how networked intelligence affects privacy interests.117 
On this score, the IRTP A seeks to establish protection of privacy and 
civil liberties by setting up a five-member Privacy and Civil Liberties 
1 13. Swire, supra note 19, at 1360-65. Swire suggests an amendment of FISA to require 
that an application certify, '"the information sought is expected to be sufficiently important 
for foreign intelligence purposes to justify' the initial (and any subsequent) FISA order." Id. 
at 1364. Swire's hope is that this amendment will "assure that the extraordinary FISA 
procedures be used only where investigators [are] seeking to advance foreign intelligence 
goals." Id. 
1 14. See generally ACLU, SURVEILLANCE COMPLEX, supra note 56. In contrast to the 
warning of the ACLU, the 9/11 Commission noted the new privacy issues following from 
networked intelligence but called only in general terms for privacy protections and 
presidential leadership on this issue. 9/11 COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 394. 
115. TAPAC REPORT, supra note 53, at 52-53. 
116. Id. at 76. 
1 17. As a possible model, we note that the Homeland Security Act created a Privacy 
Office at the Department of Homeland Security. 6 U.S.C. § 142 (2002). It obligated the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to "appoint a senior official in the Department to assume 
primary responsibility for privacy policy." Id. Among the responsibilities of the privacy 
official are: 
(1) assuring that the use of technologies sustain, and do not erode, privacy protections 
relating to the use, collection, and disclosure of personal information; 
(2) assuring that personal information contained in Privacy Act systems of records is 
handled in full compliance with fair information practices as set out in the Privacy 
Act of 1974; 
(3) evaluating legislative and regulatory proposals involving collection, use, and 
disclosure of personal information by the Federal Government; 
(4) conducting a privacy impact assessment of proposed rules of the Department or that 
of the Department on the privacy of personal information, including the type of 
personal information collected and the number of people affected; and 
(5) preparing a report to Congress on an annual basis on activities of the Department 
that affect privacy, including complaints of privacy violations, implementation of the 
Privacy Act of 1 974, internal controls, and other matters. Id. 
For a report from this office, see PRIVACY OFFICE, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., REPORT 
TO THE PUBLIC ON EVENTS SURROUNDING JETBLUE DATA TRANSFER: FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (2004). For a general argument about the benefits of privacy oversight, 
see Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055 (2004). 
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Oversight Board. 1 18 The Board gives advice to the President and 
agencies of the executive branch and provides an annual report of 
activities to Congress.1 19 Among its oversight activities, the Board is to 
review whether "the information sharing practices of the departments, 
agencies, and elements of the executive branch . . .  appropriately 
protect privacy and civil liberties."120 The Board is also to "ensure that 
privacy and civil liberties are appropriately considered in the 
development and implementation of . . .  regulations and executive 
branch policies."121 Regarding PISA surveillance, IRTPA also 
mandates that the Attorney General provide more detailed reporting 
to Congress on governmental surveillance practices and the 
government's legal interpretations of FISA.122 
As a final note, we wish to observe that data mining and the new 
intelligence network are inherently linked. For example, if the new 
intelligence network is poorly designed or maintained, data mining is 
unlikely to realize its promise, such as it may be. Furthermore, if data 
mining is abused or the contributing agency's intelligence is 
compromised because of data mining, the intelligence network may 
well dry up. As a result, any analysis of either data mining or the new 
intelligence network must also consider the relationship between the 
two activities. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Terrorism, Freedom, and Security develops a series of nuanced 
responses that are available to U.S. policymakers and lawmakers in 
responding to the threat of terrorism. As Heymann also points out, 
intelligence is of paramount importance in thwarting terrorist plots 
and in dismantling the infrastructures upon which terrorists rely. 
Generating and disseminating intelligence that meets these needs 
poses many challenges, which Heymann masterfully explores. 
In Part II of this Review, we have focused on the operational and 
privacy implications of two of these necessary policy tasks: 
constructing an intelligence network that allows needed information 
to be shared with agencies involved in counterterrorism, and assessing 
the implications of data mining. Both government officials and private 
citizens will turn to the instruments of law and the legal processes of 
the executive branch, the Congress, and the judiciary in efforts to 
1 18. IRTPA § 1061, 118 Stat. at 3684. 
119. IRTPA § 1061(c), 118 Stat. at 3684-85. 
120. IRTPA § 1061(c)(2)(B), 1 18 Stat. at 3685. 
121. IRTPA § 1061(c)(l}(C), 118 Stat. at 3685. 
122. IRTP A § 6002, 118 Stat. at 3743. 
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resolve these operational and privacy challenges. The necessary task 
requires generating and sending the best possible intelligence out to 
the officials who need it while also protecting our constitutional 
liberties. How the United States goes about resolving these issues will 
demonstrate much about the nation's capacity to sustain a difficult and 
contentious legal, policy, technological, and cultural discussion of 
surpassing importance. 
